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The Recruitment of Colonial Troops in Africa and 
Asia and their Deployment in Europe during the 
First World War 
 
Christian Koller 
 
The impact of the First World War on the colonies was profound and many-sided.1 A conflict 
that began in the Balkans turned into a general European war in July and August 1914, and 
then took on extra-European dimensions, particularly as some of the belligerent states ranked 
as the most important colonial powers globally.  
 
After the outbreak of the war, there was immediate fighting in several parts of the world as 
Great Britain, France, Belgium and Japan as well as the British dominions Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa attacked the German colonies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Most 
of these territories were conquered by the Entente powers within a short time. Already in 
October and November 1914, Japanese troops occupied the German islands in Micronesia and 
captured the city of Tsingtau, where about 5,000 Germans were made prisoners of war.2 
Between August and November 1914 troops from Australia and New Zealand conquered 
Samoa, New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, all of them German possessions. 
 
The German colonies in Africa were defended by so-called ‘Schutztruppen’, made up of 
German officers and African soldiers. While British and French troops overwhelmed Togo in 
August 1914, the fighting in Cameroon lasted until January 1916.3 German South West Africa 
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was attacked by South Africa on behalf of the Entente powers. This caused problems in South 
Africa itself, however, for about 11,500 anglophobe Boer soldiers rebelled, some of them 
openly joining the German side. The South African war between the British empire and the 
Boers had only ended twelve years before, and many Boers had preserved their anti-British 
feelings. Once this rebellion was crushed, the Germans were left defenceless, for 50,000 
South African soldiers faced only 5,000 men in the German colonial forces. When South 
African troops entered the capital city Windhuk in May 1915, they did not meet any 
resistance.4 
 
The most important colonial theatre was German East Africa, where fighting lasted until the 
end of the war. German forces here were under the command of Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck 
and consisted of only about 7,500 men, most of them Africans. British troops, on the other 
hand, comprised about 160,000 soldiers and one million carriers. All the same, they were not 
able to defeat the Germans for more than four years, for Lettow-Vorbeck soon turned to a 
guerrilla strategy and escaped again and again. Furthermore, he also attacked Belgian and 
Portuguese colonial troops. Only in November 1918, after about 10,000 British soldiers and 
100,000 carriers had died, did Lettow-Vorbeck surrender. The fighting in East Africa had a 
catastrophic economic as well as ecological impact. The economies of German East Africa 
and of bordering British colonies were deeply damaged by both sides’ ongoing use of forced 
recruitment. Famines and epidemics spread and lasted beyond the war’s end. Furthermore, 
migrations caused by the war led to a spread of the tsetse fly, which in turn explains the 
prevalence of sleeping sickness in East Africa in the following decades.5 
 
However, the colonies (or some of them) were not only theatres of war, but they were also 
integrated into the European powers’ domestic war economies. They supplied goods and 
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some of them also made financial contributions. India, for instance, contributed 146 million 
pounds to the British war costs between 1914 and 1920 and supplied products such as cotton, 
jute, paper and wool. In the French possessions in North Africa, the process of integration into 
France’s war economy led to far-ranging administrative and economic reforms. Increasing 
demand for foodstuff at first improved the economic situation of North Africa’s agriculture. 
In the years 1917 and 1918, however, harvests in Algeria and Tunisia were very bad, which 
caused famines. Furthermore, hitherto imported industrial goods were replaced by home-
made ones, which promoted the development of a North African industry. However, no 
sustainable industrialisation process took place. After the end of the war, imports from France 
would destroy these nascent industries in North Africa.6 French West Africa mainly provided 
palm oil, palm kernel and peanuts. However, its integration into the French war economy was 
chaotic rather than planned. The French colonial and military administration could not decide 
whether this area should be used primarily as a base for economic exploitation or whether the 
focus should be laid on the recruitment of soldiers.7 
 
In addition to the fighting in the colonies and the increased economic exploitation of native 
peoples for the war effort in Europe, the First World War also witnessed migration from the 
colonial world to Europe on an unprecedented scale. Among the temporary migrants from the 
colonies and semi-colonial regions to Europe were both war workers and soldiers. 
 
About 215,000 civilian war workers from South Africa (31,200), the West Indies (8,000), 
Mauritius (1,000) and the Fiji Islands (100) as well as from China (92,000) and Egypt 
(82,000) came to work behind the British front,8 whilst France recruited about 220,000 
workers from outside Europe, coming from Algeria (75,900), Indochina (49,000), Morocco 
(35,000), Tunisia (18,500) and Madagascar (5,500) as well as from China (36,700).9 The 
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massive presence of extra–European male war workers led to problems in France. French 
workers often saw these colonial migrants as rivals for jobs as well as for women, and there 
were numerous attacks on them, especially towards the end of the war. French trade unions 
were on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, they stressed internationalism and rejected 
all forms of racism. On the other hand, they were aware that the colonial workers were often 
misused as strike breakers. The French government, for its part, pursued a policy of strict 
segregation between colonial workers and French civilians and would send the former home 
as soon as possible after the end of the war.10 
 
Even more significant in terms of both numbers and public attention was the temporary 
migration of colonial soldiers to Europe. The Entente powers deployed about 650,000 
colonial soldiers on European battlefields. White European settlers from the colonies and 
dominions, who provided large contingents as well, are not included in this figure. The 
Central Powers, on the other hand, were not able to deploy any colonial troops in Europe. 
 
Britain, altogether, mobilised about 1.5 million Indian soldiers during the war, of whom about 
90,000 were killed. Some 150,000 Indian soldiers were deployed in Europe from September 
1914 on. The overwhelming majority of Indian troops, however, fought in Mesopotamia 
against the Ottoman empire.11  
 
On the other hand, Britain did not deploy any African troops on European battlefields, 
although there was a group of officers and politicians with colonial background lobbying to 
do so.12 Winston Churchill, for instance, claimed in a House of Commons speech in May 
1916 that not only ten to twelve Indian divisions but also African units should be trained for 
deployment in Europe: 
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Let us ... think what historians of the future would write if they were writing a history of 
the present time and had to record that Great Britain was forced to make an inconclusive 
peace because she forgot Africa; that at a time when every man counted ... the 
Government of Great Britain was unable to make any use of a mighty continent ... It 
would be incredible; but it is taking place ... What is going on while we sit here, while 
we go away to dinner, or home to bed? Nearly 1,000 men – Englishmen, Britishers, men 
of our own race – are knocked into bundles of bloody rags every twenty-four hours ... 
Every measure must be considered, and none put aside while there is hope of obtaining 
something from it.13 
 
Plenty of British African troops, however, fought in the Middle East and in Africa itself. 
Some battalions of the black ‘British West Indies Regiment’ were deployed in France, but 
only in ancillary functions, not as combatants.14 Officially, this policy was justified with 
reference to logistical problems, but racism probably played a role as well, for after the 
United States had joined the war, the British army also rejected the training of African 
American soldiers, who where eventually incorporated into the French army.15 
 
Unlike Britain, the French deployed large numbers of African troops in Europe, including 
172,800 soldiers from Algeria, 134,300 from West Africa, 60,000 from Tunisia, 37,300 from 
Morocco, 34,400 from Madagascar and 2,100 from the Somali Coast. Another colonial 
contingent of about 44,000 men came from Indochina.16 Italy, who joined the Entente side in 
spring 1915, tried to deploy African colonial troops in Europe as well. In August 1915, some 
2,700 soldiers from Libya were shipped to Sicily. However, they did not enter the front line, 
because many soldiers died from pneumonia immediately after their arrival, and so, the 
 
 
 
6 
Libyans, who were designated for Alpine warfare, were shipped home again after a short 
time. In the African theatres of war, however, Italy deployed plenty of Eritrean, Libyan and 
Somali soldiers.17 
 
My contribution shall focus on three aspects of this transcontinental military migration 
between 1914 and 1918. In the first instance, I will analyse colonial recruitment policies and 
the responses they met by the colonised. Secondly, I shall consider the colonial troops’ 
deployment on European battlefields, including two issues often discussed by contemporaries: 
whether colonial troops were misused as canon fodder and whether they fought especially 
cruelly. And finally, the cultural impact of military migration, especially mutual perception of 
Europeans and colonial soldiers, will be analysed. 
 
Recruitment 
Recruitment of colonial troops in India followed the traditional pattern of the theory of 
‘martial races’. The British army only recruited from the small number of castes it considered 
‘martial’, which effectively eliminated most of the Indian population from the manpower 
pool. Furthermore, Indian troops were segregated by caste into companies and battalions. As 
such, replacements could not be assigned where needed but had to go to units restricted to 
their caste.18 
 
Whereas the British colonial troops consisted exclusively of volunteers, the French 
recruitment policy in North and West Africa was a mixed one, including the enlistment of 
volunteers as well as conscription. In 1912, the French parliament had passed several acts 
enabling conscription in West Africa, Algeria and Tunisia (but not in Morocco), if the 
numbers of volunteers were considered to be too low. Conscription became more and more 
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important the longer the war lasted.19 Whilst in 1915 only 2,500 out of a total of 14,500 new 
recruits in Algeria were conscripts, this ratio changed dramatically in the second half of the 
war. In 1917, the army enlisted 6,261 volunteers and 25,925 conscripts, in the following year 
there were 13,942 volunteers and 34,173 conscripts.20 During the 1915/16 recruiting 
campaign in West Africa, only 7,000 out of 53,000 recruits were volunteers.21 The customary 
procedure was to ask local chiefs to provide potential recruits. Most often, young men from 
lower social strata, especially from the group of domestic slaves, were presented to French 
recruitment officers.  
 
French recruitment in West Africa met all sorts of resistance, ranging from malingering and 
self-mutilation to flight into the bush or to Liberia, Gambia, Portuguese Guinea and the Gold 
Coast. In Senegal alone, some 15,000 men avoided conscription by hiding in the bush or 
flight. In some cases, as in Bélédougou in 1915, there was even armed resistance against 
French colonial administration and recruitment officers. Other rebellions such as the big 
uprising in Western Volta in 1915/16 and several revolts in the north of Dahomey in 1916 and 
1917 were at least partially caused by French recruitment policies.22 
 
In North Africa, there was resistance against forced recruitment as well. As early as the 
autumn of 1914, young Arabs threatened by conscription and their relatives protested against 
French recruitment practices in several parts of Algeria. In the winter of 1916/17, Algerian 
resistance against conscription climaxed in a big uprising in the southern parts of 
Constantinois.23 In Tunisia, too, there were several smaller rebellions in the years 1915 and 
1916.24 Only Morocco, where there was no conscription, remained quiet. 
 
In spite of these acts of resistance, certain military and colonial circles in metropolitan France 
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were in favour of an expansion of colonial recruitment. In 1915, General Charles Mangin 
launched a propaganda campaign for the recruitment of half a million soldiers in the French 
colonies. Mangin was already well known as a former participant in the 1898/99 Fashoda 
expedition and as the most important advocate of the force noire, a strong African army for 
deployment in Europe, from 1909 on. Whilst most metropolitan newspapers supported his 
suggestions enthusiastically, colonial experts remained rather sceptical. So did the French 
government, which decided on a modest expansion of recruitment in Africa only.25 In March 
1916, ministerial attaché Paulin wrote to the colonial administration in Dakar that the colonial 
minister had agreed to a further enlistment campaign ‘only because he was forced into it by 
public and parliamentary opinion, although he was never really convinced by it’.26 
 
French colonial officials had first been in favour of recruitment, but, in view of African 
resistance, they soon changed their minds. In August 1914, William Ponty, Governor-General 
of French West Africa, had written to Paris that ‘there would be extreme enthusiasm if people 
were informed that the natives were to be given the honour to fight in France’.27 His successor 
Clozel, however, stated only a year later: 
 
The brutal and badly prepared effort demanded by Ponty, aggravated by the officers’ 
incompetence, has completely disgusted everyone. We are exhausted. No more cadres, 
no more physicians to examine recruits seriously ... I shall launch another modest 
recruitment drive, so that, if the war continues, we can send six or seven thousand men 
in order to fill the holes, but this will be a terrible effort.28 
 
In September 1917, Governor-General Joost van Vollenhoven obtained a temporary cessation 
of recruitment in French West Africa. Vollenhoven stressed that France should rather 
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prioritise the economic exploitation of West Africa:  
 
This African empire is poor in men but rich in products, so let us use its miserable 
population for food supply during the war and for post-war times! This country has 
been ruined just to recruit another few thousands of men!29 
 
Furthermore, Vollenhoven pointed at African resistance against recruitment: 
 
Recruiting the Black army out of volunteers is a utopia; its creator has been mistaken, 
facts have proved this so dramatically that this issue can no longer be discussed ... Since 
the beginning of the war, recruitment has become a hunt for men ... Out of recruitment 
has resulted an unpopularity that has become universal from the very day when recruits 
were asked to serve in Europe and grim, determined, terrible revolts started against the 
white man, who had hitherto been tolerated, sometimes even loved, but who, 
transformed into a recruiting agent, had become a detested enemy, the image of the 
slave hunters he had defeated and replaced himself.30 
 
When the government in Paris in winter 1917/18 decided to resume recruitments in West 
Africa, Vollenhoven desperately wrote:  
 
The natives don’t want to supply any more men and we won’t get more by convincing 
them. If we really need new tirailleurs, we will have to recruit them forcibly, running 
the risk of a general revolt.31 
 
Embittered, he resigned and volunteered for the front, where he fell in July 1918.32 
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In order to organise the new recruitment campaign, the French government appointed Blaise 
Diagne Commissaire de la République dans l'Ouest Africain with the powers of a Governor-
General. Diagne had been the first Black African to be elected as a deputy in the French 
parliament in 1914. Like some African American leaders, he considered and propagated war 
service as a means to obtain rights. By September 1918, he had recruited 77,000 soldiers, 
many more than he had been expected to do. However, most of them were not deployed 
before the end of the war.33 
 
French officials in North Africa were less hostile towards conscription than their colleagues in 
West Africa. Charles Lutaud, Governor-General of Algeria, even explicitly announced an 
expansion of conscription of Arabs in 1916.34 In the following year, however, he opposed 
governmental plans for a premature enlistment of the 1918 age group, arguing that ‘even 
though we managed to suppress last November’s uprising, the tribes’ submission is far from 
absolute’.35 Thereupon, the government renounced these plans and even re-introduced the 
system of replacements and dispensations they had, against Lutaud’s will, abolished the year 
before. However, the government’s ambition to recruit another 50,000 Algerian Arabs in 
1918 by abolishing the system of dispensations again and expanding conscription to the south 
of Algeria, where no working colonial administration was yet in existence, was criticised by 
colonial officials as unrealistic. When Paris persisted, colonial administrations put the new 
policy into practice. However they managed to recruit far fewer soldiers than Paris had hoped 
for.36 
 
In the second half of the war, those in favour of a strong armée jaune also became more and 
more influential and recruitment in Indochina was intensified.37 However, Indochinese 
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soldiers were mainly deployed in ancillary functions, for there were reservations concerning 
their fighting abilities. In addition to conscription in its own colonies, several proposals were 
made to recruit paid fighters in Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen. The French government, 
however, never seriously considered these plans, which would have boosted German 
propaganda’s allegations that the Entente powers were cowards who preferred to rely on 
mercenaries to do their fighting.38 
 
Deployment 
Colonial troops had already entered the front line in Europe in the first months of the war. At 
the end of September 1914, two Indian divisions (the 3rd Lahore and the 7th Meerut division) 
as well as a cavalry brigade arrived in Marseille and in October, the first Indian soldiers were 
deployed at Ypres. In the following months, Indian troops fought in many important battles 
on the western front, for instance at Festubert in December 1914 and in September 1915; in 
the second battle of Ypres in March 1915, where they for the first time were confronted with 
gas attacks; and at Loos in September 1915. 
 
It soon became clear, however, that Indian troops were poorly prepared for modern 
industrialised warfare. As British policy since the 1857 mutiny had been to keep the Indian 
army always one generation behind in weaponry, they first had to be completely re-equipped 
at Marseille where they received new rifles, ammunition, machine guns, and both field and 
heavy batteries of artillery. Nevertheless, the losses of the first weeks were extremely high. 
Furthermore, evidence began to mount in November 1914 that men of many different 
battalions were shooting themselves in order to be taken out of the line. Thus, throughout the 
year 1915, British military leaders, who mainly attributed these failures to the climate, 
debated whether Indian troops would better be deployed elsewhere. The two infantry 
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divisions were eventually withdrawn from the western front in December 1915 and shipped to 
extra-European theatres of war, mainly to Mesopotamia. 
 
The Indian cavalry remained in Europe and would fight in several important battles on the 
western front, for instance at the Somme in July 1916. Furthermore, an Indian infantry 
brigade also participated in the Gallipoli operation from April 1915 to January 1916. The 
overwhelming majority of the Indian army, however, was deployed in the Middle East as well 
as in East Africa.39 
 
Autumn 1914 also witnessed the first actions of African troops on the western front. Although 
North African units had already fought in previous European wars – in the Crimean war from 
1854 to 1856, in the Italian war in 1859 and in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870/71 – , this 
was the first time that troops from sub–Saharan Africa had entered the front line. In 
September 1914, West African units fought in Picardy. In October and November, Tirailleurs 
Sénégalais were deployed at Ypres, where they suffered heavy losses. 
 
Afterwards, a new doctrine was applied: West African troops no longer fought as independent 
units, but they were ‘amalgamated’ with European troops. Every regiment of the troupes 
coloniales, which were composed of Europeans, got a West African battalion after the 
historical model of amalgamation of old troops and volunteer corps during the French 
revolution.40 The same doctrine was enacted for North African troops, who were often 
amalgamated into so-called régiments mixtes together with European settlers from North 
Africa. This doctrine was also aimed at preventing the desertion of Muslim soldiers to the 
Germans, who were using their alliance with the Ottoman empire to pose as friends of Islam 
and even to recruit Muslim POWs to the Central Powers’ cause.41 
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In the following years, African troops participated in most of the principal battles on the 
western front, for instance at the Marne, at the Yser, at the Somme and at Verdun.42 
Furthermore, West African troops also participated in the Gallipoli operation and fought in 
the Balkans from 1916 on. Their number grew as the war continued. Thus while 17 West 
African battalions fought on the western front in 1916, there were already 41 in 1917 and 
even 92 in the war’s final year. The number of North African soldiers fighting in Europe 
increased considerably as well. 
 
Two questions concerning the colonial troops’ deployment in Europe were already 
contentious during the war itself, namely whether colonial troops were misused as canon 
fodder and whether they fought especially cruelly. The canon fodder theory also entered 
scholarly discussions after the war.43 
 
Charles Mangin, the most important promoter of the force noire, had already propagated the 
deployment of African units as shock troops in pre-war times. Mangin had argued that 
because of its demographic development, France would have to rely on colonial forces to a 
much higher degree in the future. For historical as well as racial reasons, West African 
warriors would be especially well-suited to fill the gap. They had already been held in high 
esteem by Arab and Ottoman rulers as very martial people. In addition, Mangin argued, they 
were especially suitable for modern warfare because of their under-developed nervous system 
and their hereditary fatalism that would allow them to sleep in the trenches in the midst of a 
battle, if they were ordered to do so.44 
 
On the western front, African troops were indeed often deployed as shock troops. Thus, 
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French soldiers used to interpret the emergence of African troops as an unmistakable sign that 
an attack was imminent. Henri Barbusse, for instance, in his literary war diary Le Feu, 
described Moroccan soldiers as follows: 
 
One looks at them and is silent. One would not speak to them. They are imposing and 
even frighten a bit. ... Of course they are heading for the front line. This is their place, 
and their arrival means we are about to attack. They are made for attacking.45 
 
French propaganda also developed similar themes: 
 
From the very first hour on, African regiments had the privilege to occupy the most 
dangerous posts, which permitted them to enrich their book of traditions and past 
glory.46  
 
Colonel Petitdemange, responsible for West Africans’ training in the camp of Fréjus in 
southern France, wrote in a letter in January 1918 to a colleague that African soldiers were 
‘cannon fodder, who should, in order to save whites’ lives, be made use of much more 
intensively’.47 And even Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, in a speech delivered to the 
French Senate on 20 February 1918, stated: 
 
We are going to offer civilisation to the Blacks. They will have to pay for that ... I 
would prefer that ten Blacks are killed rather than one Frenchman – although I 
immensely respect those brave Blacks –, for I think that enough Frenchmen are killed 
anyway and that we should sacrifice as few as possible!48  
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Thus it is clear that there was at least the intention to assign colonial troops to especially 
dangerous tasks. The question remains, however, whether this doctrine caused significantly 
higher casualty rates than with European troops. After the war, Mangin published the 
following casualty rates for the French army: 
 
Colonial soldiers: 20.0 percent 
European soldiers: 15.8 percent 
European officers: 22.0 percent49  
 
These figures have repeatedly been interpreted in scholarly debates on the cannon fodder 
thesis.50 However, any attempt to verify or challenge this thesis by interpreting casualty rates 
is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, there is an issue with the statistics themselves. For 
the whole period, French casualties were registered for the different ranks, but not for the 
soldiers’ origin. The figures most commonly quoted come from a report by Baron Lyons de 
Feuchin, published in 1924 on behalf of the army committee of the French parliament. 
According to this report, 22 percent of deployed West African soldiers fell in the war, 13 
percent of North Africans and 7 percent of other French colonial troops. In total, the casualty 
rate of French colonial troops was 14 percent, while that for European combatants in the 
French army reached 18 percent.51 
 
Yet there is much confusion over the casualty rates of African troops. In the official Histoire 
militaire de l’A. O. F., published in 1931, as well as in a 1936 publication by the Ministère 
des Pensions, West Africans’ casualty rate was slightly lower than in Feuchin’s report. 
According to a 1919 study by the Direction des Troupes Coloniales, it was even considerably 
lower, reaching only 19 percent.52 On the other hand, according to non-official figures, West 
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Africans’ real casualty rate was considerably higher. Colonial officer Edouard de Martonne 
published a figure of 65,000 West Africans killed in action, which would equal a casualty rate 
of 48 percent.53 For the casualty rates of North African contingents there is confusion as well. 
The number of Moroccan soldiers killed in action ranges between 2,500 and 9,000 or between 
7 percent and 24 percent.54 The most frequently cited figure for fallen Algerians is 19,000 or 
11 percent. Immediately after the war, however, reported Algerian dead reached up to 56,000 
or 32.5 percent.55 Some scholars even claim that 100,000 Algerians were killed.56 
 
Yet, even if the statistics were more reliable, it would be too simplistic to base any judgment 
of the cannon fodder thesis on global figures of killed and wounded alone, for this neglects 
the temporal dimension of deployment. The overwhelming majority of Indian troops, for 
instance, were only in Europe for fifteen months and their time spent at the front was 
probably shorter than that of European soldiers. West African troops used to be withdrawn 
from the front and transferred to camps in southern France during the winter months, because 
French officials thought they could not bear cold weather. Furthermore, the overwhelming 
majority of North and West Africans only came to Europe in the second half of the war. Thus, 
casualty rates should not be compared to overall figures of deployed soldiers, but to average 
figures.  
 
Joe Harris Lunn, analysing annual casualty rates of West Africans, concludes that in the last 
two and a half years of the war, when their deployment in Europe reached its peak, the rate of 
killed and wounded West African soldiers was twice that of French infantrymen. Given the 
fact that West Africans used to be withdrawn from the front in the winter months, the 
probability of a West African soldier being killed during his time at the front was two and a 
half time as high as for a French infantryman. For the members of ethnic groups considered 
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‘martial’, such as the Wolof, Tukulor and Serer, it was even three times as high.57 
 
Another approach is to analyse casualty rates for individual battles. This can be done, thanks 
to figures provided by Marc Michel, for the battle of Reims (July 1917), the offensive at Vil-
lers-Cotterêt (July 1918) and the battle at Avre (July/August 1918). In all these battles, the 
rate of killed, wounded and missed was higher for West Africans than for French infantrymen 
(Reims: 29.0 percent to 27.5 percent; Villers-Cotterêt: 33.6 percent to 23.6 percent; Avre: 
19.8 percent to 17.5 percent).58 There are also figures for several battles where Indian and 
British troops fought together. Here, there is hardly any difference between colonial and 
metropolitan soldiers. In the second battle of Ypres, the rate of killed, wounded and missing 
reached 30.4 percent for Indians and 29.8 percent for British soldiers.59 In the battle of Neuve 
Chapelle, the casualty rate for British soldiers was even higher than for Indians (21 percent 
compared to 19 percent).60 
 
On balance, the canon fodder thesis can neither be entirely verified nor falsified by 
interpreting statistics. As far as West Africans are concerned, however, not only the doctrine 
of deployment, but also Lunn’s analysis contradicts Marc Michel’s statement that the canon 
fodder thesis was just a legend.61 
 
The second question linked to the deployment of colonial troops in Europe is whether they 
fought especially cruelly. The allegation that Africans and Indians engaged in brutal practices 
which were not in accordance with international law soon became a standard topic in German 
propaganda.62 Alleged atrocities committed by colonial soldiers included violations of 
international regulations on the treatment of wounded combatants and prisoners captured on 
the battlefield, the hunt for trophies such as fingers, ears and heads, and the use of allegedly 
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unlawful weapons such as the coupe-coupe, long bush knives, in close combat. 
 
Did these allegations have any substance? First, it is striking that German propaganda 
repeatedly told the same atrocity stories involving colonial soldiers. Thus, if these stories, 
which hardly number a dozen, were based on reality at all, they were obviously isolated 
events. On the other hand, in German propaganda publications dealing with alleged Entente 
violations of international law in general, cases involving colonial troops did not appear more 
frequently than average.63 As far as close combat is concerned, the use of the coupe-coupe 
cannot be denied,64 yet this was by no means unlawful and it is doubtful whether the use of 
these knives was more ‘barbaric’ than the use of bayonets and spades in close combat. The 
stories about the cutting off of ears and heads were probably the German response to Entente 
propaganda concerning German atrocities in Belgium, where the cutting off of Belgian 
children’s hands was a standard topic.65 
 
Yet the notion that some of the atrocity stories were at least partly true cannot be dismissed 
out of hand. Some of the French colonial troops indeed originated from areas where the hunt 
for heads as trophies had been an important element of traditional warfare.66 Furthermore, 
there are also French sources – albeit hostile to the deployment of colonial troops in Europe – 
which talk about colonial soldiers proudly displaying heads and ears.67 In general, however, 
colonial troops’ methods of warfare did not differ significantly from those of European 
units.68 
 
Cultural Impact 
The deployment of more than half a million African and Asian soldiers in Europe had a strong 
cultural impact. Never before had so many Europeans been confronted with so many Africans 
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and Asians – as comrades in arms, as enemies at the front, or as prisoners of war. This 
produced discourses about the colonial soldiers, which included exoticism, racism and 
paternalism.69 On the other hand, never before had so many men from the colonies been 
directly exposed to the realities of European culture and society. The experience had an 
impact on their perceptions of their colonial masters and on the long-range, changed colonial 
relationships. 
 
European images of African and Asian soldiers evolved in different ways on both sides of the 
western front. In Germany, representation further developed along the line of racist pre-war 
imagery, even reaching the extremes of representing colonial soldiers as beasts. In summer 
1915, the German Foreign Office put into circulation a pamphlet with the title Employment, 
Contrary to International Law, of Coloured Troops upon the European Theatre of War by 
England and France, in which, as mentioned above, many atrocities were attributed to 
colonial soldiers, such as the poking out of eyes and the cutting off of the ears, noses and 
heads of wounded and captured German soldiers.70 The colonial troops were labelled with 
expressions that negated their quality as regular military forces, for example ‘a motley crew 
of colours and religions’, ‘devils’, ‘dehumanised wilderness’, ‘dead vermin of the 
wilderness’, ‘Africans jumping around in a devilish ecstasy’, ‘auxiliary rabble of all colours’. 
Other idioms used included ‘an exhibition of Africans’, or ‘an anthropological show of 
uncivilised or half civilised bands and hordes’, ‘black flood’ or ‘dark mud’, and finally the 
catch phrase ‘the black shame’ [schwarze Schmach] which quickly rose to common usage in 
the early 1920s.71  
 
However, another image – diametrically opposed to the above – was to be found in 
publications trying to justify the German practice of recruiting Muslim POWs for the 
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Ottoman army or in propaganda attempting to prove the cannon fodder thesis. Thus German 
propaganda sought to profit from the alliance with the Ottoman empire and to present the 
Central Powers as friends of Islam, for instance by arranging the publication of several texts 
by the Algerian officer Rabah Abdallah Boukabouya, who had deserted in 1915.72 Muslim 
deserters and prisoners of war were interned in the so-called ‘crescent camp’ 
(Halbmondlager) at Wünsdorf near Berlin, which comprised a mosque erected at the Kaiser’s 
expense.73 As for German civilians, some of them developed a more exotic view than official 
propaganda and met African and Asian POWs with curiosity and fascination, albeit often 
tinged with fear. 
 
Another recurrent theme in German propaganda against the deployment of colonial troops on 
European battlefields was its alleged impact on the future of the colonial system and the 
supremacy of the ‘white race’. If African and Asian soldiers were trained in the handling of 
modern arms, if they were brought to Europe and saw the white nations fighting against each 
other, and if they were even allowed to participate in these battles and experience the 
vulnerability of the white man, then they would lose their respect once and forever. After the 
war, they would turn their weapons against their own masters and remove colonial rule. Thus 
German propaganda argued that the French and British policy of deploying colonial troops in 
Europe was a flagrant breach of white solidarity and should be condemned by every civilized 
nation.74 
 
Entente propaganda countered these allegations within the patterns of pre–World War 
argumentation, albeit with some modifications. In the first months of the war, representations 
of colonial troops in the French press did not differ much from German propaganda images. 
Two weeks after the outbreak of the war, the Dépêche Coloniale portrayed African soldiers as 
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démons noirs who would carry over the Rhine, with their bayonets, the revenge of civilization 
against modern barbarism.75 In February 1915, the Marseille-based journal Midi Colonial 
published a cartoon showing a Muslim soldier wearing a necklace with German soldiers’ ears. 
The subtitle ran: ‘Be silent, be careful, enemy ears are listening!’76 
 
Beginning in 1915/16, officials propagated a modified image of infantile and devoted 
savages. The colonial soldiers were depicted as belonging to races jeunes and as absolutely 
obedient to the white masters because of the latter’s intellectual supremacy.77 Alphonse 
Séché, for instance, stated in the weekly L'Opinion:  
 
For the black man, the white man’s orders, the chief’s orders are summarised in one 
word that he repeats again and again ‘y a service’ … He won’t discuss; he does not try 
to understand. He would kill his father, mother, wife, child, in order to obey to the order 
he received. He is not responsible; a superior’s will is more important than his own one 
… In all the blacks’ acts, we find this mixture of childlike innocence and heroism … 
The Senegalese is brave by nature; as a primitive being, he does not analyse … For the 
Senegalese, his officer is everything; he replaces the absent chief of his village, his 
father. If the Senegalese has confidence in his chief, he does not do anything without 
consulting him …78  
 
This image also appeared in two special issues of the Depêche Coloniale Illustrée in January 
1916 and in February 1917 as well as in Lieutenant Gaillet’s book Coulibaly. Les Sénégalais 
sur la terre de France (published in 1917).79 In pictorial representations, the images of the 
bloodthirsty brute and of the infantile savage were alternating.80 The infantile savages in 
French wartime propaganda – often described as grands enfants – appeared as naïve and 
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almost sexless. Therefore, they were a danger neither to white supremacy in the colonial 
world, nor to the French metropolitan population. 
 
This propaganda was produced to counter German propaganda as well as to calm the French 
population’s reservation about the African troops’ presence in France. Large parts of the 
French population seem to have shared the image of colonial troops as bloodthirsty savages 
that was omnipresent in the German propaganda. When the first units from West Africa 
arrived in France, large crowds welcomed them shouting: ‘Bravo les tirailleurs sénégalais! 
Couper têtes aux allemands!’81  
 
This image also seems to have caused a latent popular opposition against stationing African 
soldiers at the Côte d'Azur. Lucie Cousturier, who had been acquainted with several wounded 
Senegalese soldiers in the military hospital at Fréjus during and after the war, wrote about the 
French population’s feelings toward the Africans in her book Des Inconnus chez moi (1920):  
 
In April and May of 1916 we were very anxious about our future friends … There 
was simply no crime that one could put beyond them: … drunkenness, theft, rape, 
epidemics … ‘What will become of us?’ the farmers’ wives moaned ... ‘We cannot 
let our little daughters go out alone any more because of those savages. We do not 
even risk going out alone ourselves any more … Imagine! If you were in the hands of 
those gorillas!’82 
 
Below the level of official French propaganda, for instance in trench journals, images very 
similar to those of German propaganda were also to be found as far as sexuality was 
concerned. A postcard depicting an African grasping a white French woman’s breast with the 
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cry ‘Vive les Teutons’ has to be seen in this context.83 Thus to some extent German 
propaganda on this topic seems to have reflected the French poilu’s fears. 
 
The French military administration promoted the image of primitive savages, too. For 
instance, African soldiers were given boots from the French arsenals that were far too big for 
them, as their feet were supposed to have enormous dimensions because of permanent 
barefooted walking.84 As late as in 1917, there was a proposal that West African soldiers 
should fight barefoot, because with French boots, ‘those agile apes are loosing one of their 
best infantry qualities, namely their elasticity at marching’.85 
 
French propaganda also again and again stressed the alleged identity of interests between 
France and its colonised peoples. The Revue de Paris, for instance, stated in 1915:  
 
Their existence, their destiny is connected to ours. It is our task to elevate them to a 
superior life and to protect them from German rule that everywhere has been very hard 
for indigenous peoples and that considers its colonies only as a field of exploitation. So, 
we have got the right – and not only the master’s right – to request our subjects’ help, 
for their interests are mingled with ours.86  
 
According to the journal Afrique Française, the grands enfants joyeux wanted to prove by 
their disciplined heroism their gratitude towards the ‘glorious country that civilised them’.87 
In June 1917, a Journée de l’Armée d’Afrique et des troupes coloniales was celebrated in 
order to demonstrate the ties between motherland and colonies.88 
 
On balance, this stress on the colonial soldiers’ bravery and loyalty was intended not only to 
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counter German propaganda concerning France’s supposed ‘betrayal’ of white solidarity, but 
also to offset objections from French military circles and especially colonial administrations. 
Yet, despite the utter contrary lines of argument in German and Entente propaganda, basic 
common structures can be delineated. Both sides held a similar view of colonial soldiers as 
fundamentally different and inferior, which implies a common European racism. 
 
But how did colonial soldiers perceive Europe and the Europeans? Several scholars have 
examined this question by analysing letters and memoirs as well as by conducting studies 
based on oral history. As for Indian soldiers, there exist several articles on war letters.89 These 
show a far from uniform strategy on the part of Indian soldiers coping with the experience of 
a completely foreign world.  
 
Some of the Indian soldiers obviously were able to integrate what they experienced in Europe 
into their cognitive background. They enjoyed honour gained on the battlefields and were 
proud of the English king’s power. Thus, a wounded Garhwali wrote to a friend in India in 
February 1915: 
 
England is a superb country with an excellent climate. Think it a great honour that we 
have an opportunity of showing our loyalty to our great Emperor by the sacrifice of our 
bodies and by the favour that is accorded to us of being present on the field of battle … 
If our ancestors help us and God shows us favour, if we die on the battlefield in the 
service of our King, this is equal to entering heaven … My prayer is that the great God 
will quickly make me well and give me an opportunity of showing my loyalty.90 
 
Soldiers from this group even thought it possible to marry a European woman, albeit 
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following Indian customs.  
 
For a second group, there was a large gap between what they were used to in India and what 
they experienced in Europe. Comparing these two worlds, they arrived at a rejection of their 
own customs and habits and an unconditional admiration for the European social, economic 
and gender order. A Hindu military surgeon stationed in England, for instance, stated in a 
letter to a friend in Peshawar at the beginning of the year 1915: 
 
When one considers this country and these people in comparison with our own country 
and our own people one cannot be but distressed. Our country is very poor and feeble 
and its lot is very depressed. Our people copy the faults of the British nation and leave 
its good qualities alone. We shall never advance ourselves merely by wearing trousers 
and hats and smoking cigarettes and drinking wine. In fact they have a real moral 
superiority. They are energetic. We are poor and hunger for ease. They limit their 
leisure, do their work justly and do it well. They do not follow their own inclinations, 
but obey their superior officers and masters. They avoid idle chatter. Their delight is 
cleanliness. Even a sweeper will not remain in a bare house. He will adorn it with some 
green plants and flowers and will take pains to improve his condition. Never under any 
circumstances do they tell lies. As for shopkeepers, everything has a fixed price. You 
may take it or leave it as you please.91 
 
Muslim soldier Shah Nawaz even wrote in a letter from Marseille in September 1915:  
  
The Creator has shown the perfection of his benefice in Europe, and we people have 
been created only for the purpose of completing the totality of the world. In truth, it has 
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now become evident that the Indian is not fit to stand in any rank of the world. You may 
be sure that India will not rise to the pitch of perfection of Europe for another two 
thousand years. The French nation is highly civilised, and they have great soldiers to an 
extent of which we are not – and never could be – worthy.92 
 
A third group of Indian soldiers tried to defend their cultural identity, to meet their religious 
duties and traditional expectations as men and warriors. However, it was particularly soldiers 
from this third group who went on to suffer despair and resignation. 
 
As for West African soldiers, the two key sources available are Bakary Diallo’s memoirs93 
and an extensive oral history study conducted by Joe Harris Lunn in the 1980s.94 Bakary 
Diallo’s memoirs entitled Force–bonté were published in 1926 as the first book in French 
authored by a Black African. Diallo had obviously strongly adhered to French colonial 
ideologies. He first describes himself and his comrades as being on the same level as French 
children, who than gradually reached the higher stages of French civilisation thanks to 
military service, until they were completely assimilated and started even to dream in French. 
 
Diallo’s war experience, however, differed from that of most of his comrades in several 
respects. He had volunteered for the French army as early as 1911, so he did not experience 
the forced conscription between 1914 and 1917 that traumatised West African populations. 
Diallo’s front experience was not representative either. He had only been at the front for a 
relatively short time. Already on 3 November 1914, he was wounded and afterwards 
promoted. He gained a distinction for bravery and was even granted French citizenship in 
1920. After the war, he would remain in France until 1928. 
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Thanks to Lunn’s oral history study, we are also informed about the war experience of a 
larger group of West Africans. Lunn interviewed 85 Senegalese veterans in 1982/83, about 
half of the veterans still living at that time. His book shows, that important cultural changes 
in Franco-Senegalese relations took place in the years from 1914 to 1918. West Africans 
would no longer perceive the French as almighty ‘devils’, as they had done before. This 
would promote their self-consciousness in the post-war period. 
 
Conclusion 
On balance, the deployment of colonial troops in Europe proved to be a dramatic experience 
for all contemporaries. Forced recruitment in the colonies met several forms of resistance, 
including even armed rebellions. Deployment in Europe would then change many Africans’ 
and Asians’ perceptions of their colonial masters and of Europeans in general. Europeans, on 
the other hand, whilst preserving racist stereotypes, became aware of the precariousness of 
their global dominance. However, the impact of colonial troops’ deployment in Europe in 
World War I on the colonial system is still debated. In particular, the colonial veterans’ 
digestion of their European experience was far from uniform.  
 
The use of colonial troops would remain an issue in the early 1920s, when France (unlike 
Britain) deployed many African and Asian soldiers as occupation troops in the German 
Rhineland. German propaganda now altered the blood-thirsty beast into ‘lusty coloured 
murderers’ who raped; the poster Jumbo became famous showing an enormous black soldier 
wearing nothing but a helmet and pressing white women to his belly. Although the vast 
majority of African occupation troops on the Rhine came from Morocco and Algeria, people 
generally spoke of the ‘black shame’ and the ‘black horror’ in a propaganda campaign lasting 
more than two years and backed by all political parties with the exception of the extreme 
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left.95 In the aftermath of the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr in January 1923, the 
German propaganda campaign against the ‘black shame’ evidently decreased. Apparently, in 
the eyes of the Germans the French had discredited themselves so deeply before the 
international community that further topical reference to ‘colonial troops’ was no longer 
needed.  
 
In the Second World War, colonial troops were deployed on European battlefields once again. 
During the western campaign, the German leadership planned a similar propaganda initiative 
as in the previous war. On 23 May 1940, the section Wehrmachtpropaganda of the 
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) passed an urgent directive that all propaganda 
channels should ‘quickly take photographs showing particularly good-looking German 
soldiers with particularly bestial-looking Senegalese Negroes and other coloured prisoners of 
war ... Sharp racial contrasts are of special importance’.96 Because of the western campaign’s 
brevity, the propaganda in the spring of 1940 was not as intense as in the years 1914–1923. 
This time, however, the perception of colonial soldiers as inferior beings was not restricted to 
pamphlets and posters. German troops, when they captured French units, sometimes 
systematically sought out African soldiers and shot them immediately. At least 3,000 soldiers 
are estimated to have died in this way.97 In the last months of the war German propaganda 
again represented black French soldiers as murderers and rapists.98 The colonial troops’ last 
battles did not take place in Europe, however, but in the decolonisation wars of the 1950s and 
60s, where troops from one colony would often be deployed to fight against anti-colonial 
uprisings in another.99 
 
 
 
29 
 
                                                
Notes 
1 For an overview see Waites, ‘Peoples of the Underdeveloped World’, 596-614. 
2 See Burdick and Moessner, The German Prisoners-of-War in Japan; Krebs, ‘Die etwas andere 
Kriegsgefangenschaft’, 323-37. 
3 See Grove, ‘The First Shots of the Great War’; Krech, Die Kampfhandlungen in den ehemaligen deutschen 
Kolonien. 
4 See Davenport, ‘The South African Rebellion, 1914’; Garson, ‘South Africa and World War I’; 
Katzenellenbogen, ‘Southern Africa and the War of 1914–1918’, 107-121; Krech, Kampfhandlungen.  
5 See von Lettow-Vorbeck, Meine Erinnerungen; Deppe, Mit Lettow-Vorbeck; Buhrer, L'Afrique orientale 
allemande; Paice, Tip and Run; Samson, Britain, South Africa and the East Africa Campaign; Anderson, The 
Forgotten Front; Strachan, The First World War in Africa; Gardner, German East; Bradley, ‘The 1914–18 
Campaign’, 27-36; Greenstein, ‘The Impact of Military Service’; Hodges, The Carrier Corps; Krech, 
Kampfhandlungen; Miller, Battle for the Bundu; Mundro and Savage, ‘Carrier Corps Recruitment’; Hodges, 
‘African Manpower Statistics’; Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 240-72; Michels, ‘Askari – treu bis in 
den Tod?’, 171-86. 
6 See Bernard, L'Afrique du Nord; Meynier, L'Algérie révélée; Goldstein, Libération ou annexion. 
7 See Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique. 
8 See War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort, 772; Carrington, ‘The Empire at War’, 642; Beckett, ‘The 
Nation in Arms’, 13-14; Grundy, Soldiers without Politics, 54; Besson and Perreau-Pradier, L'Effort Colonial 
des Alliés, 121-2; Willan, ‘The South African Native Labour Contingent’; Smith, Jamaican Volunteers in the 
First World War; Schulze, Die Rebellion der ägyptischen Fallahin, 120-1; Summershill, China on the Western 
Front; Wou, Les travailleurs chinois. 
9 See Nogaro and Weil, La main-d'œuvre étrangère et coloniale; Varet, Du concours apporté à la France, 41-5; 
Boussenot, La France d'outre-mer, 67-73; Schor, Histoire de l'immigration en France, 40-4; Sarraut, La mise en 
valeur, 43; Duomg, L'Indochine pendant la Guerre de 1914–1918, 107-132; Ray, Les Marocains en France, 48-
59; Meynier, Algérie révélé, 405-13 and 459-84; Talha, Le salariat immigré, 63-78; Ageron and Julien, Histoire 
de l'Algérie contemporaine, 1157-60; Stora, Ils venaient d'Algérie, 14-15; Chen, Chinese Migrations; Wang, 
‘Chinesische Kontraktarbeiter’, 440-3. 
 
 
 
30 
                                                                                                                                                   
10 See Stovall, ‘The Color Line behind the Lines’. 
11 See Greenhut, ‘The Imperial Reserve’; Ellinwood and Pradham eds., India and World War 1; Merewether and 
Smith, The Indian Corps in France; Willcocks, With the Indians in France. 
12 See Killingray, ‘The Idea of a British Imperial African Army’. 
13 Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol. 82, 2023-5. 
14 See Smith, Jamaican Volunteers. 
15 See Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 64.  
16 Sarraut, Mise en valeur, 44. 
17 Hill ed., The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, vol. 9, 588. 
18 See Greenhut, Imperial Reserve. 
19 See Echenberg, ‘Paying the Blood Tax’; Michel, ‘Le recrutement des tirailleurs’; Clarke, West Africans at 
War. 
20 Meynier, Algérie révélée, 405. 
21 Michel, L'appel à l'Afrique, 84. 
22  See Cornevin, La République populaire, 418-23; de Rivières, Histoire du Niger, 224-30; Michel, L’appel à 
l'Afrique, 50-7, 100-16, 118-20 and 127-30; Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 33-58; Fournier, Historique du 2e 
Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais, 169-89; Echenberg, ‘Les Migrations militaires’; Asiwaju, ‘Migration as 
revolt’, 577-94; Hebert, ‘Révoltes en Haute Volta’; Garcia, ‘Les mouvements de résistance’; Johnson and 
Summes, ‘World War I. Conscription and Social Change in Guinea’; D’Almeida-Topor, ‘Les populations 
dahoméens’; Lombard, Structures de type féodal, 412-28; Suret-Canale, Schwarzafrika, vol. II, 183-91; Loth, 
Geschichte Afrikas, vol. II, 119-22; Kouandété, Un aspect de l'insurrection nationaliste; Mercier, Tradition, 
changement, histoire, 435-48; Gnankambary, ‘La révolte bobo de 1916’. 
23  See Ageron and Julien, Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine, 1142-3 and 1150-7; Meynier, Algérie révélée, 
569-98. 
24 See Lejri, L'histoire du mouvement national, 157-63. 
25 See Michel, L’appel à l'Afrique, 73-81; Margueritte, L'immense effort, 127-33. 
26 Cited in Delafosse, Maurice Delafosse, 310. 
27 Cited in Michel, L’appel à l'Afrique, 43. 
28  Cited in Delafosse, Maurice Delafosse, 310. 
29  Cited in Michel, L’appel à l'Afrique, 132. 
 
 
 
31 
                                                                                                                                                   
30 Cited in ibid., 133. 
31 Cited in Delafosse, Maurice Delafosse, 338. 
32 See Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts, 44; Une ame de Chef, 27-8 and 264-6. 
33 See Glinga, ‘Ein koloniales Paradoxon’, 21-37; Crowder, ‘Blaise Diagne and the Recruitment of African 
Troops’, 104-21; Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, pp. 73-81; Michel, L’appel à l'Afrique, 223-38; idem., ‘La 
genèse du recrutement’. 
34 See Ageron, Les Algériens musulmans, vol. 2, 1146-7. 
35 Cited in ibid., 1162. 
36 Ibid., 1064-5. 
37 See Fernand Farjenel, ‘Une armée jaune’, Revue de Paris 23 (1916): 112-37. 
38 See Mangin, Lettres de Guerre, 125-6; Ageron, Algériens musulmans, 1164; idem., ‘Clemenceau et la 
question coloniale’, 80. 
39 See Merewether and Smith, Indian Corps in France; Willcocks, With the Indians in France; Greenhut, 
Imperial Reserve; Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, 38-40, 65-6, 78-82, 114-23 and 160-2; Mason, A Matter of 
Honour, 412-21; Smith, Britain's Brigade of Gurkhas, 42-51 and 72-84; Tuker, Gorkha, 192-200; MacMunn, 
The Martial Races of India, 318-40; Farwell, The Gurkhas, 86-104; idem., Armies of the Raj, 248-66; Bolt, 
Gurkhas, 90-6; Trench, The Indian Army, 31-66; Mollo, The Indian Army, 139-44; Banskota, The Gurkha 
Connection, 122-30; History of the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles, 217-71 and 310-17; Besson and Perreau-Pradier, 
Effort Colonial des Alliés, 123-4; Pradhan, ‘The Indian Army and the First World War’, 49-67; idem., ‘The Sikh 
Soldier in the First World War’,177-211; Ellinwood, ‘Ethnicity in a Colonial Asian Army’, 89-144; Latter, ‘The 
Indian Army in Mesopotamia’, 92-102, 160-79 and 232-46.  
40 See Balesi, From Adversaries to Comrades-in-Arms, 99. 
41 See Bernard, L'Afrique du Nord; Horne, The Price of Glory, 111-12. Also Heather Jones’ contribution to this 
volume. 
42 See, e. g. Michel, L’appel à l'Afrique; Bekraoui, ‘Les soldats marocains’; Kamian, Des tranchées de Verdun. 
43 See, e. g. Horne, Price of Glory, 100-101; Goldstein, Libération ou annexion, 176-7; Crowder, ‘The 1914–
1918 European War and West Africa’, 494. 
44 See Paul Mangin, ‘Troupes noires’, Revue de France 16 (1909): 61-80 and 383-98.; idem., ‘Soldats Noirs en 
Europe’, Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales 13 (1909): 449-60.; idem., La Force Noire; idem., ‘Troupes 
 
 
 
32 
                                                                                                                                                   
noires’, Revue de Paris 18 (1911): 484-94; idem., ‘De l'emploi des troupes noires’, Revue anthropologique 21 
(1911):113-28. 
45 Barbusse, Le Feu, 48-9. 
46 Boussenot, France d'outre-mer, 43. 
47 Cited in Michel, L’appel à l'Afrique, 323. 
48 Cited in Ageron, Clemenceau et la question coloniale, 80. 
49 Paul Mangin, ‘Comment finit la guerre’, Revue des Deux Mondes 57 (1920), 794. 
50 See Barrows, ‘L’influence des conquêtes algériennes et coloniales’, 111; Lunn, ‘Kande Kamara Speaks’, 39. 
51 Cited in Becker, Les Français dans la Grande Guerre , 316 as well as in Michel, L’appel à l'Afrique, 408. 
52 Michel, L’appel à l'Afrique, 407-8. 
53 Edouard de Martonne, ‘La Vérité sur les Tirailleurs Sénégalais’, Outre-Mer. Revue Générale de Colonisation 
7 (1935), 41. 
54 See Bidwell, Morocco under Colonial Rule, 297. 
55 See Recham, Les musulmans algériens, 23-4. 
56 Benamrane, L'émigration algérienne, 28, Ruf, ‘Politische und ökonomische Ursachen’, 68. 
57 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom, 140-7.  
58 Michel, L’appel à l'Afrique, 329-30. 
59 See Merewether and Smith, Indian Corps in France, 332. 
60 See Greenhut, ‘Imperial Reserve’, 65. 
61 Michel, L’appel à l'Afrique, 337. 
62 See e.g. Auswärtiges Amt, Employment, Contrary to International Law, of Coloured Troops; Belius, Die 
farbigen Hilfsvölker. 
63 See e.g. Frankreich und die Genfer Konvention, 2 vols. (s. l., 1917); German Reichstag, Völkerrecht im 
Weltkrieg. 
64 See Deroo and Champeaux, La Force Noire, 62-5. 
65 Horne and Kramer, ‘German “Atrocities” and Franco-German Opinion’; idem., ‘War between Soldiers and 
Enemy Civilians’; idem., German Atrocities, 1914. 
66 See Sterckx, La tête et les seins, 79-81. 
67 See e.g. Marthe Bigot, ‘Armée Noire’, Humanité, 31 October 1920, 1. 
68 See also Read, Atrocity Propaganda, 4. 
 
 
 
33 
                                                                                                                                                   
69 See Koller, ‘Von Wilden aller Rassen niedergemetzelt’; idem., ‘Enemy Images’, 139-57; Kettlitz, Afrikanische 
Soldaten; Lunn, ‘“Les Races Guerrières”’; Lüsebrink, ‘“Tirailleurs Sénégalais”’, 57-71; Martin, ‘German and 
French Perceptions’; Melzer, ‘The “Mise–en–Scène” of the “Tirailleurs Sénégalais”’, 213-44.  
70 Auswärtiges Amt, Employment, Contrary to International Law, of Coloured Troops. 
71 Rosen, England, 96 and 98; Valois, Nieder mit England!, 7; Borchardt, ‘Der Krieg und die deutsche 
Selbsteinkehr’, 243; Lisbeth Dill, ‘Die Gefangenenlager bei Merseburg’, Gartenlaube 63 (1915), 7-9; Ein 
Dutzend englischer Sünden wider das Völkerrecht. Tatsachen und Feststellungen (s. l., 1916), 5; Kriegschronik. 
Kriegstagebuch, Soldatenbriefe, Kriegsbilder, June 1915, 48; Illustrierte Geschichte des Weltkrieges, vol. 5 
Stuttgart etc., 1916, 307; Baer ed., Der Völkerkrieg., vol. 3, 217 and vol. 10, 107.  
72 Rabah Abdallah Boukabouya, L'Islam dans l'armée française; idem. ‘Die marokkanischen Kaids unter der 
französischen Herrschaft’, Korrespondenzblatt der Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient, 3 (1916), 220-2, 271-3 and 
328-30; idem. ‘Der General Gourand als Generalresident von Marokko’, Korrespondenzblatt der 
Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient, 3 (1916), 419-20; idem. ‘Das Protektorat über Marokko. General Lyautey und 
seine Islampolitik’, Islamische Welt, 1/3 (1917), 57-8 and 1/4 (1917), 253-4; idem. ‘Die ‘Weissen Väter’, 
Islamische Welt, 1/6 (1917), 352-3; idem. ‘Der zukünftige Friede und die algerischen Muslims’, Islamische Welt, 
1/9 (1917), 557-9. On Boukabouya see also Müller, Islam, gihad (‘Heiliger Krieg’) und Deutsches Reich, 270, 
292-6, 341-47. 
73 See Höpp, Muslime in der Mark; Kahleyss, Muslime in Brandenburg; Hinz, ‘Die deutschen “Barbaren”’, 339-
61. 
74 See e.g. Müller–Meiningen, Der Weltkrieg und das Völkerrecht, 68-9. Also Schütze, Englands Blutschuld; and 
Stibbe, German Anglophobia, 38-43. 
75 La Dépêche Coloniale, 18 August 1914. 
76 Cited in Michel, L’appel à l'Afrique, 345. 
77 See e.g. Boussenot, France d'outre–mer, 23. 
78 Alphonse Séché, ‘Les Noirs. L'âme du Sénégalais’, L’Opinion 8/41 (1915), 286-8. 
79 Gaillet, Coulibaly. 
80 See Gervereau, ‘De bien trop noirs desseins’. 
81 Cited in Diallo, Force–Bonté, 113. 
82 Cousturier, Des Inconnus chez moi, 12-13. 
 
 
 
34 
                                                                                                                                                   
83 Melzer, ‘“Mise-en-Scène”’, 222-8. This is a play on words with the expressions teutons (Teutons, Germans) 
and tétons (tits). 
84 Tharaud and Tharaud, La randonnée de Samba Diouf , 100. 
85 ‘L'utilisation des Troupes Noires’, Revue de Paris 24 (1917), 872-94 (here 882). 
86 ‘Troupes coloniales. Nos forces ignorés’, Revue de Paris 17 (1915), 265-80 (here 266). 
87 ‘Les Noirs. Soldats de la civilization’, Afrique Française 27 (1917), 317-318 (here 317). 
88 Meynier and Thobie, Histoire de le France Coloniale, vol. 2, 424. 
89 See Vankoski, ‘Letters Home’; Koller, ‘Überkreuzende Frontlinien?’; idem., ‘Krieg, Fremdheitserfahrung und 
Männlichkeit’, 117-28; idem., ‘Representing Otherness’. 
90 Omissi ed., Indian Voices of the Great War, 39. 
91 Ibid., 33-4. 
92 Ibid., 96-7. 
93 Diallo, Force-Bonté. On Diallo see also Midiohouan, ‘Le tirailleur sénégalais’, 133-51; Riesz, ‘The Tirailleur 
Sénégalais’; idem., ‘Die Probe aufs Exempel’, 433-54. 
94 Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom. See also idem., ‘Kande Kamara Speaks’; Koller, ‘“Pourquoi pleurer pour 
des fils ingrats?”’. 
95 See Nelson, ‘Black Horror on the Rhine’; Marks, ‘Black Watch on the Rhine’; Lebzelter, ‘Die “Schwarze 
Schmach”’; Koller, “Von Wilden aller Rassen niedergemetzelt”; idem., ‘Die “Schwarze Schmach”’, 155-69. 
96 Boelcke ed., Kriegspropaganda, 130. 
97 See Scheck, Hitler's African Victims. 
98 de Coquet, Nous sommes les occupants, 107. 
99 See e. g., Deroo, Force Noire, 203-11. 
